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When Austin became the first ever professor of jurisprudence in the English-
speaking world, the "province of jurisprudence" was what the professor
"determined" it to be.' Today, when a jurisprudence course is offered in al-
most all the law schools around the world, the content of this course has
become so diversified that a jurisprudence teacher from Hong Kong may find
him or herself lost in a jurisprudence class at LSE. No textbook on this sub-
ject dares to call itself "standard," and no teacher can maintain that he or she
is able to teach various topics covered in the course with equal confidence. To
teach natural law in a profound manner and cover positivism superficially
is to do injustice to the latter. However, I believe that this is what many
teachers are doing. As a jurisprudent, each teacher belongs to a certain
"school", excels in a particular way of legal thinking, and immerses him or
herself in the depth of a particular tradition. This is good for the develop-
ment of legal scholarship, but may not be good for the purpose of legal
education. The purpose of a jurisprudence course is to expose the students to
alternative ways of reasoning in the hope that they may develop a disciplined
mode of legal thinking for themselves. The most obvious way to frustrate this
purpose is to give the students an impression that there is only one way of
doing legal theory, and that that is the teacher's way. Even worse than that,
the students, intelligent and independent as they are, may not be persuaded
by the particular ideas which the teacher places emphasis on. They may be-
come disappointed with the subject, learn to memorise a set of names and
concepts before the exam and forget them all soon afterwards. To avoid such
a failure, the first thing teachers should do is to select a good collection of
introductory notes and reading materials, in which the sophisticated ideas
are introduced in the forms of dialogues, debates, and conversations. The
extracts should be diversified but still manageable.
The subject of this review provides an excellent collection of commentary
notes and reading materials. It shows a dialogical rather than monological
version of jurisprudence. The authors themselves belong to different schools
- they may not agree with each other on various issues, but they have all
committed themselves to a project of cooperation and dialogue. Furthermore,
all of the authors are experts in a particular way of legal thinking. They have
applied this way of thinking to certain practical matters, and brought their
practical insights back to this jurisprudence book. In presenting their legal
Here I refer to the title of the collection of his lectures, Province ofJurisprudence Determined (London,
1832).
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thoughts as the trunk and leaves of a living tree, rather than dead wood, they
trace the development of ideas to their origins, put concepts into their con-
versational context while maintaining their original meanings and revealing
the practical implications of the theories. Accordingly, this review shall briefly
touch upon the genealogical, exegetical and prudential aspects of this book.
Genealogy
Legal ideas are not sui generis. Every one has its ancestors, almost every one
has descendents. They should therefore be understood within the context of
their "families". Moreover, the families of legal ideas are not composed of
pure blood. Each generation of legal ideas is under the influence of its distinc-
tive social, political, cultural and economic environments, thus bringing new
elements into its body and soul.2 Most of the chapters in this book provide us
with a genealogical view, from which we can see how particular concepts and
ideas develop, dissolve, or metamorphose.
Nicola Lacey, the author of the chapter on modem positivism, has just
published a biography of H L A Hart.' Her chapter offers an excellent geneal-
ogy of Hart's conception of law. She identifies Austin, Bentham, and modem
linguistic philosophy as Hart's intellectual ancestors. As she points out, Hart
used smart tools made available by modem philosophy of language to re-
examine the legacy of Austin and Bentham, abandoning the obscure or blunt
concepts (such as Austin's "command"), and sharpening the valid ones (such
Bentham's distinction between "expository" jurisprudence and "censorial"
jurisprudence). She also insightfully contextualised Hart's descriptive sociol-
ogy of law, by arguing that Hart worked in and presumed the superiority of
the western legal tradition. His description implies an evaluation. After all,
"to obey punctually, to censure freely"4 presumes a society respecting free-
doms of expression and press.
Exegesis
The ethics of academic debate require contestants to take theories as
they are, rather than torture other scholar's arguments in order to render a
2 For this version of genealogy, denying the possibility of "pure reason", see Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History," in D F Bouchard (ed), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews (Cornell University Press, 1977).
3 Nicola Lacey, A Life of H L A Hart: the Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University Press,
2004).
4 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), Preface, para 16.
Vol 36 Part 3 Reviews 671
HeinOnline -- 36 Hong Kong L.J. 671 2006
meaning needed as a target. But many scholars failed to obey this rule. There-
fore, a good recount of debates should do justice to the distorted arguments.
The authors contribute a great deal in this respect. One salient example is
Richard Nobles and David Schiff's chapter on "Debating with Natural Law:
the Emergence of Legal Positivism." In this chapter, Nobles and Schiff do not
start by defending positivism, but by pointing out that some positivists actu-
ally missed their target. They wrongfully attribute to Aquinas that "an unjust
law is not law". Relying upon John Finnis' research, they maintain that Aquinas
only argued that just human laws which "oblige in conscience" have the full
quality of law. Lon Fuller put forward a similar argument, that law is not an
all-or-nothing matter, that there could be some half-laws, which do not have
the full moral quality of law.' From this clearer perspective, we can better
understand where the stakes lie. Natural law has a different rule of recogni-
tion, which embodies a full range of ethical considerations. There would
be no problem for most of the natural lawyers to admit evil laws as laws
so-called, but they can still criticise them as lacking the ethical quality of
law. The bottom line should be: when a "law" is so evil that we can find no
moral quality at all in it, we'd better call it "violence" under the disguise
of "law".
Phronesis
Jurisprudence is etymologically linked to prudential considerations. It is ideal
for students to learn some application skills in their jurisprudence course.
The authors of this book exemplified the modus vivendi of thinker-lawyers.
For example, Anne Barron is an expert on intellectual property law; Hugh
Collins distinguishes himself in both contract law and labour law; Gunther
Teubner excels in various fields of private law; while Lacey, Nobles, Reiner
and Schiff have made significant contributions to the scholarship and legal
reform of criminal justice. They combine their theoretical insights and prac-
tical wisdom skillfully and their pragmatic perspectives have been
illuminatively displayed in this jurisprudence book.
Teubner, Nobles and Schiff's analysis on contract, in their chapter on
legal autopoiesis, (Chapter 18), is one of the abundant examples of this
combination. Nobles and Schiff published a highly-acclaimed book on
miscarriages of justice,' which applied Niklas Luhmann's autopoiesis
5 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, revised edn, 1969), especially Ch 3.
6 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice: Law, the Media, and the
Inevitability of Crisis, with a foreword by Gunther Teubner, Oxford University Press, 2000.
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theory to make sense of the interaction between media and the legal system
on wrongful conviction issues. In this chapter, together with Teubner, they
set off on a new journey. When contract is understood in the milieu of
functional differentiation, it "can no longer be regarded as a simple exchange
between two actors and their resources," and "reappears as different projects
in at least three different social worlds: legal, economic and productive"
(p 912). By an easy extension, I would add a further political dimension (or
"world") to this analysis. This dimension is very important in assisting us
to understand private law in mainland China, where legal formalism has
never prevailed.
As argued in a recent contribution to law and development literature,
"at low levels of economic development, informal contract enforcement
mechanisms may be reasonably good substitutes for formal contract enforce-
ment mechanisms. At higher levels of development, however, informal
contract enforcement may become an increasingly imperfect substitute due
to the presence of large, long-lived, highly asset-specific investments, as well
as the prevalence of increasingly complex trade in goods and services that
often occurs outside of repeated exchange relationships".' To understand the
role of formal contract and enforcement in various contexts, we should give
more nuanced considerations on the different dynamics and communications
within different systems. For example, in mainland China, where a highly
interventionist government rules, formal contracts play a different role from
those in developed, liberal states. The Government is more willing to use
contracts as a tool to control the production and movement of the people.'
With help from the highly "abstract" theory of Luhmann, we would be in a
better position to perceive the complex dynamics in the development of an
immensely complicated economy, and the role of contract law in it.
With the above-mentioned merits and more that are not covered in this
very short review, this book provides a very good pool for both teachers and
students to learn and practice the skills of legal "theorizing".
Zheng Ge*
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